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Abstract
This study investigates whether new enrollees in the Alabama Children’s Health Insurance Program have different claims 
experience from renewing enrollees who do not have a lapse in coverage and from continuing enrollees. The analysis 
compared health services utilization in the first month of enrollment for new enrollees (who had not been in the program 
for at least 12 months) with utilization among continuing enrollees. A second analysis compared first-month utilization of 
those who renew immediately with those who waited at least 2 months to renew. A 2-part model estimated the probability 
of usage and then the extent of usage conditional on any utilization. Claims data for 826 866 child-years over the period from 
1999 to 2012 were used. New enrollees annually constituted a stable 40% share of participants. Among those enrolled in 
the program, 13.5% renewed on time and 86.5% of enrollees were late to renew their enrollment. In the multivariate 2-part 
models, controlling for age, gender, race, income eligibility category, and year, new enrollees had overall first-month claims 
experience that was nearly $29 less than continuing enrollees. This was driven by lower ambulatory use. Late renewals had 
overall first-month claims experience that was $10 less than immediate renewals. However, controlling for the presence of 
chronic health conditions, there was no statistically meaningful difference in the first-month claims experience of late and 
early renewals. Thus, differences in claims experience between new and continuing enrollees and between early and late 
renewals are small, with greater spending found among continuing and early renewing participants. Higher claims experience 
by early renewals is attributable to having chronic health conditions.
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Original Research
Adverse selection is a common occurrence in health insur-
ance plans. People know more about their likely use of health 
services than do insurers and they use this knowledge to their 
advantage. One reason for the individual mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) is that in its absence, healthier 
people are disproportionately less likely to enroll, leaving the 
plans with only the sicker individuals. Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) plans also potentially suffer from 
adverse selection. In CHIP, families pay substantially 
reduced premiums based on their income and are then 
enrolled in a stand-alone private health insurance program or 
in the state’s Medicaid program, depending on the state. 
However, their enrollment and their premiums are not tied to 
their health status.
In CHIP, one might see adverse selection manifest itself in 
two ways. First, children with ongoing health problems, 
knowing their likely greater need of services, quickly enroll 
when the program becomes available to them, and they 
renew immediately to maintain coverage and access to their 
health care providers. Second, the child may experience a 
serious acute health event that lands them in an emergency 
department or a hospital bed. In this circumstance, the family 
may enroll or renew their enrollment as quickly as possible 
to minimize additional costs, or the health care provider may 
assist them in doing so.
Alabama, the focus of this study, is 1 of 17 states in which 
CHIP participants are enrolled in stand-alone coverage. 
Alabama CHIP enrollees have access to the same Blue Cross 
Blue Shield (BCBS) of the Alabama network of providers as 
all other BCBS enrollees in the state. Eligibility is limited to 
households with income between 100% and 300% of the 
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federal poverty level (FPL). Currently, an eligible family 
with a single child would pay a premium of $0, $52, or $104 
per year, depending on their income level and Native 
American status. Each premium provides 12 months of cov-
erage. Even at these premiums, a majority of enrollees do not 
re-enroll within 12 months. However, they face no penalty 
for not re-enrolling and may newly enroll at anytime. Thus, 
it is conceivable, and perhaps likely, that adverse selection in 
enrollment and renewal is present in the Alabama CHIP. 
Such patient selection may have budgetary implications for 
the state and the federal government as programs expand, 
contract, or change significant program characteristics. 
Moreover, the pattern of selection, if any, has implications 
for the ACA.
In brief, we use Alabama CHIP claims data for the first 
month of enrollment or re-enrollment over the 1999 through 
2012 period to identify differences in spending in total and in 
5 major subcategories of expenditure. We find that new 
enrollees had first-month claims experience that was nearly 
$29 lower per enrollee than that for those who were continu-
ously enrolled. Late enrollees had claims experience that was 
approximately $10 lower than that for those who renew 
immediately, controlling for other factors. Adding prior 
claims experience to the predicting equations for the late 
renewal analysis, we find that virtually all of the difference 
in expenditures for immediate renewals is attributable to 
those with chronic conditions. Thus, adverse selection exists 
within the Alabama CHIP program, but virtually all of it is 
attributable to the re-enrollment behavior of children with 
chronic conditions.
Background
There is remarkably little evidence on the extent of adverse 
selection among children in health insurance plans. There is 
substantial evidence of healthier people disproportionately 
enrolling in closed-panel managed care plans1 and of high-
cost Medicare Advantage enrollees disproportionately 
returning to traditional Medicare.2,3 The closest evidence is 
from studies of employer-sponsored coverage and Medigap 
plan purchase. Cutler and Zeckhauser survey the early 
literature.4 More recently, Bundorf et al used data on demo-
graphics, health status, employment, and insurance coverage 
from the 1996 to 2002 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) to examine the extent of adverse selection among 
low-, medium-, and high-income households and coverage 
in small, medium, and large employer-sponsored insurance 
plans. They concluded that
in aggregate, the likelihood of obtaining employer-sponsored 
coverage nearly always increases with expected health 
expenditures. The positive relationship between insurance status 
and expected expenditures is generally consistent across the 
large group, medium group and small group markets. . . . [This] 
is consistent with a moderate amount of adverse selection.5(p30)
With respect to Medigap plans, Fang et al found that control-
ling for a host of factors associated with income, education, 
and cognitive ability, those with higher expected medical 
expenditures were more likely to purchase Medigap.6 
However, to our knowledge, no study has examined the 
extent of adverse selection in enrollment or re-enrollment in 
a public insurance program, and certainly none has examined 
adverse selection in a CHIP plan.
Methodology
This study uses all claims data from the inception of the 
Alabama CHIP program in 1999 through 2012. We define a 
“new enrollee” as a child who has not been enrolled in the 
ALL Kids program for at least 12 months, thus including 
both those who are truly new to the program and those who 
have been out of the program for more than 12 months. A late 
renewal is defined as a renewal 3 to 12 months after a period 
of enrollment expires at the end of a prior enrollment period. 
We experimented with other definitions of lapsed renewal 
but these alternatives did not materially affect the results.
First, we describe the claims experience in the first month 
of enrollment for those who are new enrollees relative to 
those who are continuous enrollees. We do this in total and 
for major categories of expenditures. Similarly, we describe 
the claims experience of those with late renewals relative to 
immediate renewals. In both cases, we examine the first 
month of coverage claims experience to explore the extent to 
which enrollment may have been triggered by a health event. 
Expenditures throughout the study are measured in constant 
2012 dollars computed using the Consumer Price Index, All 
Items.
Second, we estimate a series of 2-part regression models 
to more rigorously examine the effects of new enrollment 
and late renewal on first-month claims experience. A “2-part 
model” is used in circumstances in which there are a dispro-
portionate number of observations with zeroes for the out-
come of interest. The first part of the model estimates the 
decision to obtain care or not and the second estimates the 
extent of claims costs, given any. We estimate a logit first 
stage and then a log-Poisson second stage in a generalized 
linear model. We then recombine the results for new enroll-
ees and for late renewals to report the policy-relevant overall 
impact.
The general model takes the form of the following:
Z fi t,
/ , , , , ,
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where Z
i,t
 is any expenditures or the conditional amount of 
spending of child i in year t. The models are estimated for total 
spending and for spending by several major categories of care: 
inpatient, emergency department, specialist, hospital outpatient, 
and well-child visit. New/Late alternatively reflects whether the 
child was a new enrollee, or in separate regressions, whether he 
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or she was enrolled after a lapse in enrollment. Age and its 
square are included to capture potentially different health con-
cerns in older children. Gender and race are included to explore 
whether there are differences in first-month expenditures by 
demographic factors. Race is categorized as black and other, 
with white as the reference category. FPL threshold refers to the 
child’s eligibility level for benefits and is measured as three 
dichotomous variables: family income between 101% and 
150% of the FPL, 151% and 200%, and 201% and 300%. 
Native American children are eligible with no premiums or 
co-pays and serve as the reference group.
In the late renewal analysis, we are able to introduce data 
on prior utilization because we have prior year data on health 
services use. We include a variable on whether the child had 
a diagnosis of a chronic condition in the prior 12 months.7 
(We also explored whether the advent of a new school year 
precipitated first-month claims experience; it did not.)
Findings
Figure 1 shows the 15-year trend in the proportion of new 
enrollees. After initial years with large proportions of new 
enrollees, by 2003 new enrollment had stabilized at approxi-
mately 40% of enrollees. The year 2012 saw the lowest pro-
portion of new enrollees (35%). Approximately 5.5% of 
children who are renewed in the program within 12 months 
are renewed in the first renewal month. Mean monthly 
enrollment is 8.3% of the annual total and there was no dis-
cernible pattern in enrollment over the year.
Table 1 shows the constant dollar mean first-month spend-
ing of new enrollees and late enrollees relative to immedi-
ately enrollees. The upper panel shows the mean expenditures 
including those with no first-month expenditures. Thus, the 
average claims cost of a new enrollee was $111 in the first 
month of enrollment compared with $139 for late enrollees 
and $153 for immediate enrollees. This suggests some 
adverse selection on re-enrollment among those who renew 
immediately. This high use is driven largely by greater 
hospital outpatient expenditures.
The lower panel displays the proportion of enrollees who 
had any first-month claims expenditures and the amount of 
those expenditures, conditional on having any. These mea-
sures better reflect the costs per service rather than per mem-
ber per month costs at the program level. More than 28% of 
new enrollees used any health services in the first month of 
coverage compared with 34.5% of late enrollees and 41.7% 
of those who were immediately re-enrolled. There is also 
some evidence that late and immediately renewed enrollees 
were somewhat more likely to visit the emergency depart-
ment, a specialist, and an outpatient facility than were new 
enrollees. Thus, there is a suggestion of adverse selection in 
that immediately renewed children were more likely to use 
services.
However, given any use, there is no suggestion of greater 
spending across the groups. Late renewing children had 
higher conditional claims experience than either new enroll-
ees or immediately renewing ones. Given the large variances 
associated with these estimates, however, none of the differ-
ences are statistically significant.
Table 2 shows the estimates of the differential health 
expenditures of new enrollees relative to continuously 
enrolled children in the first column and the differential 
expenditures for late renewals relative to immediate renew-
als in next two columns.
In their first month of coverage, new enrollees have 
claims experience that is nearly $29 per child lower than that 
for those who are continuously enrolled. This is largely 
driven by lower outpatient and specialist expenditures. 
Although they do have higher inpatient hospital claims, the 
$2.38 difference is not statistically significant at the conven-
tional levels. They do have higher expenditures for well-
child visits, but the difference is only $0.25 per child.
A similar pattern of results emerges from our examination 
of first-month spending by late renewals (those renewing in 
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Figure 1. Percentage of new enrollees in ALL Kids, by year.
Note. New enrollee is defined as the one who has not been enrolled in the prior 12 months.
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months 3 through 12) relative to immediate renewals. 
Overall, late renewals have claims experience that is $10.22 
lower. Again, this is driven by lower outpatient and specialist 
claims.
For those renewing ALL Kids enrollment, we have prior 
claims experience available in the data. The final column of 
Table 2 reports first-month expenditures estimates control-
ling for the presence of a chronic condition. When this vari-
able is added, the differences in claims experience virtually 
disappears. Late renewals have first-month spending that is 
$2.64 lower, but the result lacks statistical significance. We 
do find that emergency department expenditures are mod-
estly higher ($1.42 per child). This is our only evidence of 
acute care adverse selection.
We experimented with alternative definitions of the ini-
tial window for new claims extending it up to 4 months. 
Although the magnitudes of the results change, the general 
story does not.
Discussion
Adverse selection occurs when people use their own superior 
knowledge of their likely use of health services to strategi-
cally obtain health insurance. One might expect that a parent 
with a child with a chronic condition has a greater apprecia-
tion of the immediate value of health services and has an 
established network of providers from whom to obtain their 
child’s care. In the absence of insurance premiums that 
reflect the child’s underlying health status, one might reason-
ably expect this parent to buy CHIP coverage or renew the 
policy quickly. In addition, one might expect that if a parent 
suspects that there is something wrong with his or her child, 
the person will quickly enroll the child in CHIP before seek-
ing health care. It is also conceivable that providers will 
assist in enrolling children in the program before undertak-
ing expensive treatments. All of these examples reflect 
adverse selection into a health plan.
Table 2. Effects of New and Late Enrollment on First-Month Claims Expenditures, by the Major Category of Spending.
Expenditures New enrollees Late renewals Late renewals controlling for the presence of chronic conditions
Total −28.79*** −10.22* −2.64
Inpatient 2.38 4.89 5.06
Emergency department −2.06*** 0.98 1.42*
Specialist −8.07*** −3.70* −1.37
Outpatient −13.65*** −6.44*** −3.77*
Well-child visit 0.25*** 0.88*** 0.89***
Note. Each cell reports the estimated effect from a 2-part model that controls for age, age squared, gender, race, and year. The last column also controls 
for the presence of a chronic condition.
*, **, *** significant at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals, respectively.
Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviations of First-Month Claims Experience per Child by Renewal and Renewal Time.
New enrollees Late enrollees Immediately renewing enrollees
Unconditional expenditures
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Total $111 ($938) $139 ($1039) $153 ($869)
Inpatient 19 (757) 24 (846) 18 (620)
Emergency 10 (109) 14 (161) 13 (155)
Specialist 24 (240) 32 (256) 37 (309)
Outpatient 45 (257) 55 (271) 63 (3,206)
Well-child visit 3 (25) 4 (29) 2 (21)
Conditional expenditures
 Percent with any Mean (SD) Percent with any Mean (SD) Percent with any Mean (SD)
Total 28.6% $389 ($1725) 34.5% $403 ($1739) 41.7% $367 ($1316)
Inpatient 0.2 10 681 (14 218) 0.2 10 996 (14 729) 0.2 9417 (10 608)
Emergency 2.5 395 (567) 3.1 460 (803) 2.8 476 (801)
Specialist 7.7 318 (812) 10.8 293 (726) 11.4 327 (866)
Outpatient 20.6 219 (531) 24.8 223 (510) 28.4 222 (584)
Well-child visit 2.7 113 (99) 3.0 125 (112) 2.2 106 (94)
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This analysis is subject to some limitations. First, it is a 
single-state study. Thus, the results may not be generalizable 
to other states. Second, given the nature of claims data, by 
definition we did not have prior utilization data on new 
enrollees. As a result, we were unable to directly test the 
extent to which the presence of chronic conditions motivated 
new enrollment as it appears to have motivated immediate 
renewal. This might be overcome with an all payer claims 
database, but even then data would be missing for children 
newly arriving to the system. Third, we have no information 
on household characteristics that might better inform the 
decision to acquire or renew coverage.
The results of our analysis indicate that adverse selection 
exists within the Alabama CHIP. Controlling for other fac-
tors, children who are immediately renewed in the program 
have higher spending than do either new enrollees or late 
renewals. Immediate renewals have the total first-month 
spending that was nearly $29 higher than new enrollees and 
more than $10 higher than late renewals.
Moreover, the adverse selection appears to be almost 
entirely driven by children with chronic conditions. When 
we control for prior year CHIP spending on the child in com-
parisons between immediate and late renewals the difference 
in spending becomes small and statistically insignificant. 
Without data on the prior utilization data of new enrollees, 
we cannot directly extend this result to children newly 
enrolled in the program. However, one might expect that if 
there had been serious acute events, we would see higher 
spending on new enrollees in the categories of inpatient care 
and emergency department use, which we did not observe.
There are only modest barriers to the enrollment into the 
Alabama CHIP program. Two are perhaps paramount. First, 
for a family with income between 101% and 150% of the 
FPL, the annual premium for a single child is $52; $104 for 
those with incomes between 150% and 300% of the FPL. 
For a new enrollee with family income near the poverty 
level, this may be significant if the child has no immediate 
need for health care. Second, there are transactions costs 
associated with renewal. These time costs are not excessive; 
on receipt of an invoice, parents may pay by check, or with 
a credit or debit card online or over the phone. The inertia 
associated with these costs, however, is consistent with the 
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) “nudge hypothesis” that even 
small transactions costs impel people to forego generally 
beneficially actions.8
These results suggest that adverse selection exists in the 
children’s health insurance program and is driven by chronic 
conditions. Thus, new enrollees are likely to cost more than 
those enrolling later in the program life. However, their use 
of services is likely to be concentrated among primary care 
providers. Moreover, outreach efforts to attract unenrolled 
but eligible children are likely to disproportionately attract 
children who are of low cost, relative to those already 
enrolled.
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